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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
AS A DISCOURSE ON POWER: 
AN EXAMINATION OF KEY DECISIONS FROM 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first 
divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdi-
vided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the 
rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time 
that each will be controlled by itself. 
—James Madison, The Federalist No.511 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Power. At once desired and feared, one can hardly speak of the formations of gov-
ernments, or the revolutions against them, without also speaking about power.2 The con-
solidation of too much power in too few hands, with no balance between central authori-
ty and peripheral autonomy ignited the American Revolution.3 Upon attaining 
independence from Britain, the battle began among those who faced the daunting task of 
forming “a more perfect Union.”4 These Founders, in reflection upon the abuses they had 
just escaped, created “finely wrought and exhaustively considered”5 procedures designed 
to keep separate the powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the 
newly created federal government so that the oppression and tyranny of King George III 
could not be repeated. 
Connecting the dots between pre-Revolutionary oppression and constitutional sep-
                                                          
 1.  THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). Here, Madison argues for the twin principles of “horizontal” 
separation of powers, which divides the federal government into distinct branches, and “vertical” separation of 
powers, which recognizes the distinction between national and state governments. Working together, the two 
separations provide a “double security,” of sorts, ensuring that the people have not abdicated all powers to the 
federal government. Ernest A. Young, The Federal Separation of Powers in Protecting Member State Autono-
my in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, 1655 
(2002). 
 2.  See Youngjim Jung, In Pursuit of Reconstructing Iraq: Does Self-Determination Matter, 33 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 391, 395-96 (2005). Using Iraq as a modern example, the author illustrates how power is 
central to governmental formation, individual self-determination, constitutional construction, and the relation-
ship to an occupying force, especially during belligerencies.  
 3.  See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). The signers published a list of griev-
ances against the British monarchy, primarily involving abuses of power relating to governors, legislators, 
judges, and individual rights. Following this list, it states: “In every stage of these Oppressions We have Peti-
tioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated inju-
ry. A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a 
free people.” Whatever else may have precipitated the American Revolution, oppression and tyranny from a 
centralized government was a principal reason that the colonists went to war. 
 4.  U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 5.  I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
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aration of powers is a familiar exercise from basic American civics lessons. This paper 
attempts to go one step further, extending the line of reasoning past government structure 
to judicial interpretation. Whether a court tends to interpret laws textually or teleological-
ly—that is, emphasizing the language of the law or the purpose of the law—is in part de-
pendent on the form of federalism within which that court operates. Further, the form of 
federalism in question is not only a matter of governmental structures and procedures, 
but also includes the contemporary discourse6 on power within the given federation. To 
demonstrate the hypothesis, this paper first compares the federalism of the United States 
with the federalism of the European Union (“EU”) and includes a discussion of the con-
trasting corruptions of power that gave rise to each federation. Then, it compares philos-
ophies of interpretation in the Supreme Court of the United States and the European 
Court of Justice (“ECJ”), the highest court in the EU, as functions of diverse federalist 
systems. 
Section II of this article provides a brief, but working foundation of the historical 
roots of federalism in both the United States and the EU.7 For the United States, this 
groundwork involves a brief description of the corruptions that were born out of consoli-
dating power in the British monarchy and the resulting post-Revolutionary plan to create 
a federal government with structurally and procedurally separated branches to manage 
executive, legislative, and judicial functions.8 The less familiar history of the EU, on the 
other hand, warrants a more detailed discussion.9 Following this background, Section III 
focuses on one potential objection—namely, that the Supreme Court of the United States 
has not uniformly adopted a textualist interpretive strategy, but has at times been domi-
nated by justices who prefer purposive or intentional hermeneutics.10 Section IV analyz-
es the Supreme Court’s interpretive history, both textual and teleological, as a function of 
the post-Revolutionary War, post-Civil War, and post-World War II discourse on the 
dangers of the consolidation of too much power in too few hands, the need for the sepa-
ration of powers at the federal level, and the historical emphasis on natural law.11 By 
way of contrast, this section also evaluates several cases from the ECJ that evidence the 
court’s prioritization of teleological interpretation, looking to the EU’s integrative pur-
pose over and above formal adherence to the language of law, particularly in light of the 
                                                          
 6.  In socio-cultural studies, the word “discourse” is broadly used to refer to the structures, functions, rules, 
and patterns of language. For post-structuralists in socio-cultural studies, however, it has come to mean some-
thing even more particular; discourse refers to combinations of concerns, concepts, themes, and types of state-
ments, all of which are historically produced and historically situated to such a degree that they exert power 
over language and in turn, power over a culture. See generally HUGH BAXTER, HABERMAS: THE DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (2011); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE 
PRISON (1979); ANNE WAGNER & LE CHENG, EXPLORING COURTROOM DISCOURSE: THE LANGUAGE OF 
POWER AND CONTROL (2011). 
 7.  See infra notes 13-72. 
 8.  See Bradford A. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 
1328 (2001).  
 9.  Though, it should be noted that a concise, clear history of the EU, its structures, and its treaties is nearly 
impossible, and according to some, this lack of a clear history presents a “real problem of legitimacy.” See 
Young, supra note 1, at 1621-22. Comparing the complexity of the EU to America, Young notes that the basic 
workings of the American central government may be learned from three-minute cartoons. E.g., Schoolhouse 
Rock: America Rock (ABC Home Video 1995). 
 10.  E.g., Theo I. Ogune, Esq., Judges and Statutory Construction: Judicial Zombism or Contextual Activ-
ism?, 30 U. BALT. L. F. 4, 14-21 (2000). 
 11.  Clark, supra note 8, at 1403-04 (discussing judicial compliance with federal lawmaking procedures). 
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multiple languages spoken by the Member States.12 This section ends with a proposed 
answer to the question raised in Section III. Section V offers a brief conclusion along 
with additional questions that the hypothesis raises. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. American Federalism: Separation 
The relationship between the colonies and Britain was not hostile in its begin-
ning,13 and for some time and for various reasons, the colonies even enjoyed relative au-
tonomy.14 By the time the British began to reassert their powers over the colonies (par-
ticularly with regard to taxation for the purposes of reducing large debts), colonial 
representatives had become quite skilled at employing legal rights and claims familiar to 
English barristers, solicitors, and the British public, and they began claiming that they 
should retain their rights as English citizens.15 Each colonial government provided a seat 
for voicing discontent—Boston, Philadelphia, and Williamsburg—all to send the mes-
sage that rights were being trampled by a governmental structure insufficient to hold 
back its monarch.16 Finally, after the colonies sent representatives to the Stamp Act Con-
gress to oppose taxation, and subsequent to the calling of two Continental Congresses to 
respond to abuses, boycott British goods, and petition the king, the Colonists decided 
that the time for negotiation had ended and that the time for independence and force had 
begun.17 
One need not look further than the Declaration of Independence itself to find a lit-
any of grievances demonstrating that unchecked power corrupts and necessarily leads to 
oppression.18 Among other injuries and with regard to legislative action, the signers ac-
cused King George III of allowing his governors to pass laws without the colonists’ con-
sent, of instituting legislation that affected large groups of people until they relinquished 
their right to representation, of dissolving Representative Houses for opposing “his inva-
sions on the rights of the people,” and of delaying elections.19 Regarding the judiciary, 
they accused the king of making judges’ tenure and salary dependent on “His will” and 
of depriving the colonists of trials by jury.20 According to the signers, the king further 
levied taxes on them without consent or representation, maintained standing armies in 
the colonies without consent from the legislature, and forced the colonists to quarter the 
troops.21 All this, the declaration states, is the effect of “absolute Despotism.”22 
Following the Revolutionary War and borrowing heavily from philosopher John 
                                                          
 12.  See generally Nial Fennelly, Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice, 20 FORDHAM INT’L. 
L.J. 656, 660-61 (1997). 
 13.  JOHN R. VILE, THE WRITING AND RATIFICATION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: PRACTICAL VIRTUE IN 
ACTION 2-3 (2012). 
 14.  Id. at 3. 
 15.  Id. at 3-4. 
 16.  Id. at 4. 
 17.  Id. at 5. 
 18.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
 19.  Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
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Locke, the Framers of the new American Constitution sought to create a governmental 
structure with only those powers necessary to protect the rights of “life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness.”23 It was necessary, then, to divorce from government the sorts of 
entanglements and structures that might allow it to rule by divine fiat or without proce-
dural encumbrances.24 Structurally and procedurally, the Framers conceived of a legisla-
ture, executive, and judiciary that functioned separately and independently of one anoth-
er as a further check on potential corruptions of power.25 So important was this notion to 
the Constitution’s Framers that some among them—most notably, Benjamin Franklin—
believed that the executive branch should be vested in a number of persons functioning 
together as a council.26 Though the Framers did not ultimately adopt his proposal, Frank-
lin’s proposal demonstrates their sensitivity to the corrupting potential of centralizing 
power, not only in the wrong hands, but in too few hands.27 As a result, what marked 
American federalism from its outset was the separation of governmental powers and a 
discourse that feared the consolidation of that power. 
B. European Federalism: Integration 
If it can be said that the corruption inherent in the over-consolidation of power pre-
cipitated the formation of the United States, then it might also be said that the corrup-
tions inherent in the failure to consolidate any regional power precipitated the formation 
of the European Union.28 That is, it was the complete disintegration of regional European 
interests that created the necessary sociopolitical context for what was essentially an 
eighty-year civil war, running from the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, until the end of 
World War II (“WWII”).29 Several attempts were made to remedy the political tensions, 
but each failed.30 The Treaty of Versailles, signed after World War I (“WWI”), was es-
sentially a document meant to place war guilt on Germany.31 The League of Nations, a 
precursor of sorts to the United Nations was formed in 1919, within just one year of the 
end of the war, to ensure mutual regional security; however, its strategy was also 
doomed to fail for numerous structural and sociological reasons that have been outlined 
at length.32 
In 1951, following WWII and the formation of the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation,33 six nations signed the Treaty Establishing the European Coal 
                                                          
 23.  GEORGE M. STEPHENS, LOCKE, JEFFERSON, AND THE JUSTICES: FOUNDATIONS AND FAILURES OF THE 
US GOVERNMENT 13 (2002). 
 24.  Id. at 17.  
 25.  TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE CRITICAL IDEAS OF THE CONSTITUTION 142 (Herman Belz et 
al. eds., 1992). 
 26.  SYDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE TRUE BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 357 (1898). 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Mark C. Anderson, A Tougher Row to Hoe: The European Union’s Ascension as a Global Superpower 
Analyzed through the American Federal Experience, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 83, 92 (2001).  
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Richard M. Buxbaum, A Legal History of International Reparations, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 314, 
319-20 (2005). 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  See Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and 
the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 513, 632-33 (2002).  
 33.  Anderson, supra note 28, at 88. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation was created to 
coordinate the Marshall Plan’s infusion of funds into the European post-war rebuilding effort. 
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and Steel Community (“ECSC”).34 Prior to the ECSC,35 the individual sovereign nations 
of Europe had not consolidated any powers or regional interests.36 This lack of consoli-
dation created the environment necessary for what amounted to a decades-long civil war 
that culminated in WWII.37 The purpose of the ECSC, in light of the years of European 
turmoil, was to forge interdependence between key European nations on the coal and 
steel resources necessary for the manufacture of ammunitions as well as post-war re-
building efforts.38 Creating the ECSC eased tensions after WWII by deincentivizing at-
tacks on neighboring countries and informing all ECSC countries if one ECSC country 
attempted to mobilize its forces.39 The ECSC’s progeny of subsequent treaties built upon 
this initial effort to create an increasingly interdependent Europe—one that prioritized 
the free movement of goods and people throughout Europe while still respecting member 
state sovereignty.40 The arc of EU federalism, then, is bent toward increased interde-
pendence as a response to its historical failure to integrate any of its regional interests.41 
The ECSC’s immediate purpose was to remove internal trade barriers in the re-
spective industries, but many envisioned it as “a first step in the federation of Europe.”42 
Six years later, in 1957, the same six nations signed two treaties in Rome, one creating 
the European Economic Community (“EEC”) and the other the European Atomic Energy 
Community (“Euratom”).43 The EEC Treaty in particular expanded the fledgling federa-
tion to include a common market and even called on its members to harmonize certain 
aspects of economic policy, such as agriculture (Articles 38 to 47), transport (Articles 74 
to 84), and trade (Articles 110 to 116).44 It also created the basic structural arrangements 
that characterize the current EU: the Council of Ministers, which is made up of repre-
sentatives of Member State governments; the European Commission, which, among oth-
er things, initiates legislation and monitors the implementation of the treaties; the Euro-
pean Council, a parliamentary assembly that possesses little power, but provides 
guidance; and the European Court of Justice, the court tasked with interpreting EU law 
and enforcing its obligations.45 
Following the EEC and Euratom Treaties, Europe witnessed increased membership 
                                                          
 34.  Young, supra note 1, at 1623. 
 35.  Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinaf-
ter “ECSC Treaty”], available at http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/decision-
making/treaties/index_en.htm. The ECSC Treaty was the first in a succession of treaties creating the European 
Community and eventually creating the European Union as it is today. 
 36.  Anderson, supra note 28, at 88-89.  
 37.  Larry Cata Backer, Forging Federal Systems Within a Matrix of Contained Conflict: The Example of 
the European Union, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1331, 1332 (1998). 
 38.  Members of the ECSC included France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxem-
bourg.  
 39.  See Young, supra note 1.  
 40.  GEORGE A. BERMANN, ROGER J. GOEBEL, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ELEANOR M. FOX, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 17 (2d ed. 2002). 
 41.  Young, supra note 1, at 1732-33. 
 42.  Id. at 1623 (quoting Robert Schuman, Foreign Minister of France from 1948-1953, Robert Schuman, 
Declaration of 9 May 1950, in THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 58, 59 (Da-
vid Weigall & Peter Stirk eds., 1992)). 
 43.  Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 169 [here-
inafter “Euratom Treaty”].  
 44.  Treaty on the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (now Article 234 of the 
EEC Treaty) [hereinafter “EEC Treaty”]. 
 45.  Id. 
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in the treaty community and significant advances in economic integration, culminating in 
the Single European Act (“SEA”), signed in 1986 in Luxembourg.46 Member States de-
signed the SEA to remove the remaining barriers to the single European market, making 
it more difficult for any one country to veto proposed legislation and giving its parlia-
mentary body more power.47 The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 (“Treaty on the EU”) ad-
vanced consolidation even further by officially creating the “European Union” and trans-
forming the European Community, as it was then called, into only one of the three 
“pillars” that comprise the “competences” of the EU—common market, common foreign 
and security policy, and cooperation on home affairs and justice.48 Additionally, the 
Treaty on the EU set the timetable for the eventual introduction of the Euro.49 
Three additional treaties complete the EU picture: The Treaty of Amsterdam,50 the 
Treaty of Nice,51 and the Treaty of Lisbon.52 Anticipating the entrance of new Member 
States, the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice were both designed to make the 
EU more efficient in preparation for new Member States, primarily through enhanced 
transparency in decision making and redefined voting systems.53 The Treaty of Lisbon, 
which was signed in 2007 and entered into force in 2009, sought to make the EU more 
democratic and better able to address global concerns, such as climate change, by em-
ploying a single perspective.54 It also initiated structural changes to the bodies of the EU, 
such as providing a president to the European Council, granting more power to the Euro-
pean Parliament, and introducing additional changes to the voting procedures in the Eu-
ropean Council.55 Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon clarified which powers belonged exclu-
sively to the EU, which powers belonged to Member States, and which powers were 
shared.56 
Similar to the treaties, an account of the governmental bodies within the EU57 “de-
fies easy description.”58 The legislative powers are divided between three bodies: the 
Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and the European Parliament.59 A 
fourth institution, the ECJ, exercises judicial authority over the EU.60 Suffice it to say, 
any attempt to fit the EU legislative institutions into an American framework would be 
misleading.61 One scholar has summarized the institutional organization by saying, 
                                                          
 46.  Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (1987).  
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) 1992 O.J. (C 191). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and Related Acts, 1997 O.J. (C 340).  
 51.  Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Com-
munities and Certain Related Acts, 2001 O.J. (C 80). 
 52.  Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, 2007 O.J. (C 306) [hereinafter “Treaty of Lisbon”]. 
 53.  See Young, supra note 1. 
 54.  See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 52. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  While the inner workings of the legislative process within the EU are fascinating and worth noting, 
these issues are outside the scope of this article.  
 58.  Young, supra note 1, at 1626. 
 59.  Id. at 1625. 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id. at 1628-29. 
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“[e]ach of the organs is thought to represent a certain constituency in the centre’s deci-
sion-making process: the European Commission [represents] the common interest, the 
Council [represents] the Member States, and the European Parliament [represents] the 
peoples of Europe.”62 The commission proposes EU legislation, but the council and par-
liament can request that the commission consider particular subjects.63 The council has 
the authority to approve the commission’s proposal and can even make amendments, act-
ing in conjunction with the European Parliament.64 Depending on the subject of the pro-
posed legislation, however, the role of Parliament changes.65 
The ECJ serves to interpret and enforce EU law, and thus serves a judicial and 
quasi-executive function.66 Its decisions have established principles of EU law such as 
direct effect and supremacy of EU law, as well as a number of unenumerated human 
rights, all of which fall outside the textual provisions of the treaties.67 It is from these ex-
tratextual hermeneutical maneuvers that this article’s hypothesis benefits in comparing 
the interpretive strategies of the Supreme Court of the United States to that of the ECJ.68 
American federalism, marked by a separation of powers, arose as a response to the 
corruption inherent in the consolidation of too much power in too few hands.69 Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court has a long history of textual interpretations, even when in-
cluding purpose or intent in its analysis, as a way of not intruding too far into legislative 
territory.70 By contrast, European federalism, marked by increased integration, has slow-
ly arisen through amended treaties as a response to the failure of the region to consoli-
date any power in any hands.71 Accordingly, the ECJ has a history of teleological inter-
pretations—even some that go beyond the text altogether—as a way of ensuring that the 
EU maintains the integration to which all of its treaties testify.72 Because of the emphasis 
on teleological interpretation, the EU law framework is “far from being rigid and im-
movable,” but is full of “shifting contours” because the Member States are always nego-
tiating the relationship between their own sovereignty and their combined commitments 
to Community integration.73 
                                                          
 62.  Volker Ruben, Constitutionalism of Inverse Hierarchy: The Case of the European Union 3 (N.Y.U. L. 
Working Paper No. 62 2003). 
 63.  Young, supra note 1, at 1626. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id.  
 66.  Id. at 1631-32. 
 67.  See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 40. The EU doctrine of Direct Effects gives citizens of EU Member 
States the right to commence litigation in national forums and tribunals based on EU law even while it does not 
create a cause of action in national law. The supremacy of EU law developed slowly over several cases and 
requires that when national law and EU law conflict, national law must be ignored so that EU law can take ef-
fect. The ECJ has also created several “fundamental rights” such as human dignity, right to life, respect for 
family and private life, right to found a family, right to education, and right to asylum. 
 68.  Young, supra note 1, at 1630-31. 
 69.  Markus G. Puder, Supremacy of the Law and Judicial Review in the European Union: Celebrating 
Marbury v. Madison with Costa v. ENEL, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 567, 581 (2004). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Young, supra note 1, at 1624-25. 
 72.  Fennelly, supra note 12, at 664-66. 
 73.  Koen Lenaerts, Federalism and the Rule of Law: Perspectives from the European Court of Justice, 33 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1338, 1345-46 (2010). 
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III. OBJECTION 
Before proceeding into the analysis, it is worth acknowledging that, although the 
differences between the forms of federalism in the United States and the European Union 
differ in key ways, these differences obviously do not lead to absolute distinctions in ju-
dicial interpretation such that the Supreme Court of the United States is purely textual or 
that the European Court of Justice purely teleological. The most cursory review of the 
history of American legal hermeneutics reveals that the Supreme Court has employed a 
variety of interpretive strategies along the textual-teleological spectrum—from the judi-
cial passivity integral to textualism, to the so-called judicial activism integral to more 
teleological approaches.74 
At first glance, this objection would seem to militate, and quite reasonably so, 
against the stated hypothesis. The structure of American federalism, defined in part by its 
separation of federal powers, has remained relatively constant since the nation’s found-
ing, yet there have been, at significant times throughout American history, especially 
those moments when America as a nation has been most aware of power and its potential 
abuses, shifts toward teleological constitutional and statutory interpretations. Since 
WWII and following the western world’s shift away from post-Enlightenment modern-
ism toward postmodernism,75 America’s discourse on power has become skeptical of 
formulaic and synchronic interpretations of texts and has shifted to include indications of 
the law’s purpose and intent in addition to its text.76 
This shift is not unique to America; it also mirrors the post-war discourse in Eu-
rope, and also happens to coincide with the seeds that eventually led to the creation of 
the European Union.77 It is reasonable, then, for the modern American Supreme Court to 
include interpretative strategies similar to those that have been operative in the ECJ since 
its inception. In fact, as Section IV demonstrates, it is not only the modern American Su-
preme Court that has looked to purpose or intent, but these factors have played an im-
portant role in early American interpretation. The Court in key decisions interpreted the 
Constitution and later Amendments at times in light of the text, and at times in light of 
purpose, but always within the framework of the contemporaneous discourse on power.78 
                                                          
 74.  Ogune, supra note 10, at 21-40  (comparing passivity and activism in American courts). 
 75.  Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 
668 (2008). The author discusses the differences between “postmodern unsettlement,” principles of certainty, 
and authority in statutory interpretation, such that in a postmodern world judges may be textualists and yet still 
reach “differing, even diametrically opposed” decisions. Id. 
 76.  See Geoffrey Schotter, Diachronic Constitutionalism: A Remedy for the Court’s Originalist Fixation, 
60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1241, 1250 (2010): 
Judges ascertain structural teleological meaning by analyzing the position that the provi-
sion at issue occupies in the Constitution’s contemporary structural framework at the 
moment of decision. But structural teleological meaning acknowledges the dual nature of 
this framework that results from the Constitution’s writtenness. A constitution is first and 
foremost not a document but a system by which a political power—between the various 
branches of government, between the federal government and state governments, and be-
tween the sovereign “We the People” and the political institutions governing on its be-
half—is allocated. 
Id. 
 77.  Anderson, supra note 28, at 83-84.  
 78.  Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 393, 420-21 (1996). 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The assertion that judicial interpretation is somehow structurally restrained or a 
function of a broader social discourse is certainly not axiomatic.79 Indeed, there are those 
who contend, and not without reason, that differences among interpretative strategies are 
attributable to the “variances in education, personalities, responses to the world around 
us, and outlooks on the world in which we live” of the individual judges.80 In a culture 
marked by an ideological commitment to individualism (whether or not such an ideology 
bares resemblance to reality),81 it is appealing to believe that “[e]ach judge is a distinct 
world unto himself or herself”82 and that judicial pluralism is a matter of individual psy-
chological and experiential differences between judges.83 Commitment to such a belief, 
however, ignores the degree to which legal interpretation, as an extension of the creation 
of the law, is subject to sociological forces that transcend the individual judge—forces 
such as institutional legitimization,84 social construction,85 cultural production,86 and a 
historically and structurally fluid national discourse on the law and power.87 
That lawmaking and judicial power transcends, but still includes, the individual 
through both structural arrangements and social discourse is not a modern or even a par-
ticularly American idea.88 In the late 1640s, John Locke adopted the separation of pow-
ers as a principle thesis in his philosophical work on governments.89 A half-century later, 
Montesquieu further refined this tenet.90  The works of both men influenced English po-
litical theorists and changed the shape of how the British Crown and Parliament func-
                                                          
 79.  Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
16, 21 (2002). 
 80.  Id. at 23.  
 81.  See generally Alpheus T. Mason, American Individualism: Fact or Fiction, 46 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 
(1952) (arguing that the modern world’s shift toward larger corporations and larger government has lessened 
American individualism, and criticizing the historical roots that it ever truly existed in the first place). 
 82.  Barak, supra note 79, at 23. 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593-94 (1995) (criticizing, yet acknowledging, the role played by institutional and 
political commitments in restraining statutory interpretation, which tends to idealize passive “judicial restraint” 
as the only legitimate hermeneutic). 
 85.  See Gunther Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law, 23 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 727, 728-29 (1989) (positing a “social reality of the legal person” that borrows from a broad spec-
trum of social theories and literary criticism to describe differences in legal interpretation across cultures, par-
ticularly American and European). 
 86.  See Backer, supra note 37, at 291-92 (exploring the law, its articulation, and its interpretations as an 
example of cultural “norm making” and arguing that courts are recipients rather than architects of the law as a 
cultural product). 
 87.  See Robert J. Lukens, Discoursing on Democracy & the Law—A Deconstructive Analysis, 70 TEMP. L. 
REV. 587, 592-95 (1997) (leaning on Habermas throughout, Lukens argues that the law, as well as society’s 
willingness to voluntarily obey it, is the result of democratic participation as a means of public discourse, 
which in turn shapes the ways in which the law is interpreted). See also Robert F. Nagel, Nationalized Political 
Discourse, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2057, 2057 (2001) (providing examples of how public political discourse has 
affected not only the judicial nomination and confirmation process, but also legal interpretation). 
 88.  See Pushaw, supra note 78, at 400 (discussing the philosophical influence of Locke and Montesquieu 
on the evolution of constitutional separation of powers and the need for distinct spheres of legal authority 
shared among the several branches of government). 
 89.  Id.  
 90.  Id.  
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tioned, both independently and interdependently.91 
The American Revolution both affirmed the British ideal of separation of powers 
and accused the British government of trampling that ideal.92 The Declaration of Inde-
pendence cataloged the ways in which the separation of powers were enshrined in the 
structure of British government but were nowhere to be found in its function.93 
After the Revolutionary War, the Federalists94 confronted the daunting task of 
formulating a new expression of the doctrine of separation of powers.95 Without an 
American equivalent to the British system of “hereditary aristocracy and monarchy,”96 
the Federalists argued that the People were the sovereigns and that separate governmen-
tal authorities were “the People’s agents and representatives.”97 It is in this context—a 
discourse on the failed structural arrangement of British separation of powers and the na-
tional discourse following the Revolutionary War—that the American Constitution was 
formulated.98 In addition to considerations regarding executive and legislative powers, 
the Federalists, building on Montesquieu,99 contributed to the discourse on governmental 
power in ways that ultimately won the day with regard to the government’s structure and 
function, arguing for a court of “supreme and final jurisdiction” as its own distinct 
branch: 
 
The only question that seems to have been raised concerning [the Su-
preme Court], is, whether it ought to be a distinct body or a branch of 
the legislature . . . . It may . . . be observed that the supposed danger of 
judiciary encroachments on the legislative authority, which has been 
upon many occasions reiterated, is in reality a phantom. Particular mis-
constructions and contraventions of the will of the legislature may now 
and then happen; but they can never be so extensive as to amount to an 
                                                          
 91.  Id. at 404. 
 92.  Id. at 407. 
 93.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
 94.  The Federalists’ commitments to particular structures and functions within a central government were, 
at the very least, a reflection of the post-Revolutionary War discourse on power—the notion that it was neces-
sary but dangerous if unchecked. As both recipients of and participants in a particular discourse on power, the 
Federalists proposed the centralization of power along with procedural safeguards to protect the interests of the 
People. References in this paper to the Federalists are meant to bring to mind not only their distinct political 
principles but also the contribution they made through the creation of social artifacts, such as The Federalist 
Papers, to the broader socio-cultural discourse on power. 
 95.  Clark, supra note 8, at 1346-47 (discussing the history of the Constitution as a re-imagination of feder-
alism that not only addresses the flaws in the British system but also remedies flaws in the early attempts at 
self-governance within the framework of the Articles of Confederation).   
 96.  Pushaw, supra note 78, at 411.  
 97.  Id.  
 98.  GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, 346-48 (1969).  
 99.  Pushaw, supra note 78, at 405-06 (citing BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Franz 
Neumann ed. & Thomas Nugent trans., 1949) (1748)). 
Montesquieu was the first to conceptualize “judicial power” as a distinct component 
of government (not merely an extension of executive authority) and thus assumed the 
burden of explaining why it had to be kept separate. First, judicial and executive 
power had to be divorced to avoid a tyranny in which “the judge might behave with 
violence and oppression.” Second, if judicial power were “joined with the legislative, 
the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control,” because de-
cisions would reflect the judge’s personal opinion rather than existing legal rules.  
Id. 
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inconvenience, or in any sensible degree to affect the order of the polit-
ical system. This may be inferred with certainty, from the general na-
ture of the judicial power, from the objects to which it relates, from the 
manner in which it is exercised, from its comparative weakness, and 
from its total incapacity to support its usurpations by force. And the in-
ference is greatly fortified by the consideration of the important consti-
tutional check which the power of instituting impeachments in one part 
of the legislative body, and of determining upon them in the other, 
would give to that body upon the members of the judicial department. 
This is alone a complete security.100 
 
With the fight for independence still fresh on their minds, the Federalists were all 
too aware “that a mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the sev-
eral departments, [was] not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to 
a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the same hands.”101 The 
Federalists contended that the Constitution must not only delineate the separate functions 
of the disparate branches, but it must also provide for functional “checks and balances” 
as a means of keeping the branches in their distinct and “proper places.”102 These checks 
and balances operate in two primary ways: first, they impose a limit on each branch’s 
authority by requiring the consent of different governmental bodies to make law; and 
second, they separate legislation from other government functions.103 
The separation of powers was enshrined in the Constitution as a protection for the 
people, and the Federalists relied primarily on the judicial branch to ensure its effective-
ness.104 The judicial “check” on the other branches exists in the form of judicial re-
view,105 while the principle of justiciability provides “balance” in the separation of pow-
                                                          
 100.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton). Throughout this paper, Hamilton answers objections to 
a supreme court as a co-equal branch of the federal government. His responses make it clear that the founders 
were concerned, throughout the process of drafting and ratifying the Constitution, with internal power dynam-
ics and the potential for abuse. 
 101.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison). In this paper, Madison argues that it is not enough simply to 
write a governing document that calls for structural separation of powers, as evidenced by the charges against 
the British Crown in the Declaration of Independence. There must, in addition, be functional checks and bal-
ances to protect against abuse and the consolidation of power.  
 102.  THE FEDERALIST, NO. 51 (James Madison). 
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same 
department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary 
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The 
provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the 
danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man 
must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on 
human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. 
Id. 
 103.  Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional 
Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1282-83 (2002). 
 104.  Id. at 1283. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison); Wood, supra note 98, at 598. Wood 
argues that while suspicions of the judiciary ran deep during the Revolution, by the time the Constitution was 
ratified, judges were viewed as a vehicle of, rather than a threat to, popular sovereignty. Id. 
 105.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). “It is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity 
expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of 
each.” 
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ers.106 Though neither the phrase “judicial review” nor the word “justiciability” appear 
anywhere in the Constitution,107 that does not mean that the Constitution proffers an 
“unbounded judiciary.”108 Article III grants “judicial power” that the Court may exercise 
in a broad, but not infinite, array of proceedings.109 This constitutional grant of limited 
jurisdiction restrains judges from issuing decisions that are subject to executive or legis-
lative review, essentially advisory opinions, or encroachments on the constitutional 
spheres of congressional or presidential authority.110 Two early cases illustrate these 
concepts: Hayburn’s Case111 and Marbury v. Madison.112 
A. Supreme Court of the United States: Decisions Following the American Revolution 
In Hayburn’s Case,113 three circuit court judges—Wilson, Jay, and Iredell—wrote 
opinion letters to President Washington, advising him that a 1792 statute114 requiring 
federal circuit courts to determine the pension eligibility of disabled veterans authorized 
Congress and the Secretary of War to review the courts’ decisions.115 Counter to une-
quivocal constitutional tenets, the statute in question required federal courts to exercise 
non-judicial power and, in turn, to abdicate judicial power to non-judicial branches, since 
under the law the judgments of the court could be “revised and controlled by the legisla-
ture, and by an officer in the executive department.”116 In addition to laying out a princi-
pled analysis of the essential connection between separation of powers and issues such as 
judicial independence and judicial review, the letters presented a constitutional rationale 
for restraint on all branches.117 The letters each affirmed the constitutionally-defined 
spheres of authority: Congress alone can exercise Article I118 legislative power, the Pres-
ident alone can exercise Article II119 executive power, and the judiciary alone can exer-
cise Article III120 judicial power.121 According to the judges, the statute was “radically 
                                                          
 106.  See generally Pushaw, supra note 78, at 451-52 (presenting a lengthy historical and sociological outline 
of the evolution of the doctrine of justiciability, its relationship to judicial review, and its importance in the 
separation of power). 
 107.  U.S. CONST. 
 108.  Pushaw, supra note 78, at 438.  
 109.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in 
such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The 
judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good be-
haviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall 
not be diminished during their continuance in office. 
Id. 
 110.  Pushaw, supra note 78, at 436.  
 111.  Case of Hayburn, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792). 
 112.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 113.  Case of Hayburn was oddly titled, since it was really no “case” at all. It was essentially an advisory 
opinion, or three separate advisory opinions, in the form of letters to the President about whether a particular 
law was constitutional. 
 114.  Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243. 
 115.  Pushaw, supra note 78, at 438-39. 
 116.  Case of Hayburn, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410. 
 117.  Pushaw, supra note 78, at 439. 
 118.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the Unit-
ed States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” 
 119.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. “The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America.” 
 120.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
12
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inconsistent with the independence of that judicial power which is vested in the courts; 
and consequently, with that important principle [separation of powers] which is so strict-
ly observed by the [C]onstitution of the United States.”122 
By pointing out how the 1792 statute violated the principles of separation of pow-
ers and checks and balances, Hayburn’s Case demonstrated a commitment to federalist 
principles, which were the dominant discourse on power. At the same time, the letters, 
which were little more than advisory opinions, undercut the principles they sought to 
protect, illustrating that the eventual functions of these principles were still in their early 
evolutionary stages.123 While writing advisory opinions was a common practice in Eng-
land and in several states following the Revolutionary War,124 delegates nonetheless re-
jected them during the drafting of the Constitution.125 Attempts to include advisory opin-
ions within the powers delegated to the judiciary failed for two reasons. First, the judicial 
branch could not be functionally independent if judges delivered opinions about laws 
that might later come before them in a lawsuit.126 Second, the constitutional integrity of 
the executive branch demanded that the President execute the law without consulting 
judges.127 Eventually, these concerns were embodied in the doctrine of justiciability, a 
functional expression of the separation of powers.128 
Marbury v. Madison,129 another early case that established the foundation for the 
Court’s exercise of judicial review,130 provides a second functional expression of the 
separation of powers. In Marbury, the Court at once asserted and denied the federalist 
principle of separation of powers, both structurally and functionally.131 The Marbury 
Court considered several questions, including whether the Judiciary Act of 1789 
(“Act”)132 represented a constitutional exercise of congressional power.133 The Act 
sought to grant the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus “to 
any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United 
                                                                                                                                               
 121.  Id.  
 122.  Case of Hayburn, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 410 (1792). 
 123.  Pushaw, supra note 78, at 443. 
 124.  Id. at 442.  
 125.  Id. at 443.  
 126.  See Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 
153-56 (1973) (explaining that advisory opinions were disfavored because they did not cast the law in the light 
through the process best designed to yield a “true interpretation” of it). 
 127.  Pushaw, supra note 78, at 443 n.230. 
 128.  Id. at 441.  
 129.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137 (1803). 
 130.  SHELLEY L. DOWLING, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: 
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 3 (2d ed. 2010). 
 131.  Pushaw, supra note 78, at 444. 
 132.  Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243. 
 133.  Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174. 
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judi-
cial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it 
would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the ju-
dicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the 
section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the construction. 
If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitu-
tion has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the 
constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the 
constitution, is form without substance. 
Id. 
13
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States,”134 which amounted to an expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction under Article III 
of the Constitution.135 
In its opinion, the Court contended that it had the requisite constitutional authority 
to review executive and congressional actions, such as the Act’s attempted jurisdictional 
expansion, famously stating, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of 
necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts 
must decide on the operation of each.”136 Beyond this principle, the Court further af-
firmed that it is the Constitution, and not the “laws of the United States generally” that is 
the “supreme law of the land.”137 The decision ends with the dictum, “[t]hus, the particu-
lar phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the 
principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the 
constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that in-
strument.”138 
However, the decision in Marbury was, at least on its surface, paradoxical in that 
its rationale differed with respect to the executive and legislative branches.139 In reaching 
its decision, the Court asked whether the case was justiciable.140 In determining whether 
the case was justiciable, the Court sought to distinguish those matters of the executive’s 
performance that constitute an exercise of discretionary political power, which are “polit-
ically examinable”141 from those matters that involve the executive’s ministerial duties, 
which are “judicially examinable.”142 Essentially, the Court attempted to distinguish po-
litical questions from questions within the Court’s authority for purposes of separation of 
powers.143 Regarding legislative action, the Court’s interpretation of the statute at issue 
has led some modern commentators to conclude that Chief Justice Marshall was looking 
for a way to create a check on other governmental branches inherent in judicial re-
view.144 By interpreting the statute as he did, Chief Justice Marshall “transformed judi-
cial review from the enforcement of explicit fundamental law against conceded violation 
into the open-ended exposition of supreme written law.”145 The Court’s decision effec-
tively seized the federalist tenet that the judicial branch could examine the actions of the 
executive and legislative branches, while at the same time “ignor[ing] key limits on such 
review.”146 
Writing in 1804, Thomas Jefferson also questioned the Court’s motive in Marbury, 
saying: 
                                                          
 134.  Id. at 148.  
 135.  U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2. 
 136.  Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
 137.  Id. at 180 (emphasis in original).  
 138.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 139.  Pushaw, supra note 78, at 444. 
 140.  Id. at 445. 
 141.  Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166.  
 142.  Id. at 165.  
 143.  Pushaw, supra note 78, at 445. 
 144.  Id. at 446-47.  
 145.  Id. at 448 (quoting SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 123 
(1990)). 
 146.  Id. at 448.  
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The judges, believing the [sedition law] constitutional, had a right to 
pass a sentence of fine and imprisonment; because that power was 
placed in their hands by the constitution. But the executive, believing 
the law to be unconstitutional, was bound to remit the execution of it; 
because that power has been confided to him by the constitution. The 
instrument meant that its co-ordinate branches should be checks on 
each other. But the opinion which gives to the judges the right to decide 
what laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in 
their own sphere of action, but for the legislative and executive also in 
their spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch.147 
 
Marbury, like Hayburn’s Case, represents a fascinating example of how the early 
Supreme Court and Justices that had participated in the drafting and ratification of the 
Constitution experimented with the functional separation of powers within the constitu-
tional structure.148 Doctrines like justiciability and judicial review are more products of 
the post-Revolutionary discourse on the consolidation of power than on the inevitable 
consequences of the first three articles of the Constitution, and Chief Justice Marshall’s 
decision represents the ways in which judicial interpretation is initially influenced by the 
discourse that is subsequently shaped.149 Aspects of the opinions, like the doctrines 
themselves, are compatible with the federalist priority of separating legal powers be-
tween functionally separate branches of government, while others militate against the 
principles of separation for the purpose of strengthening the central government and con-
solidating power. 150 
B. Supreme Court of the United States: Decisions Following the Civil War 
Following the Civil War, a new group of lawmakers passed several constitutional 
amendments that were not only intended to abolish slavery, but also to ensure that former 
slaves could enjoy all of the “privileges and immunities” of citizenship irrespective of 
their race, color, or status as former slaves.151 While the Fourteenth Amendment makes 
                                                          
 147.  8 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 310 (1897) (emphasis added). 
 148.  See Molot, supra note 103, at 1250-51. 
 149.  See Backer, supra note 37, at 1346. 
 150.  See Pushaw, supra note 78, at 448-49. The author’s argument throughout his discussion of Marbury, 
that Marshall’s decision does not represent the most rational interpretation of the statute and even at times con-
tradicts Federalist principles, introduces the proposition that early Court decisions were made from a teleologi-
cal rather than textual perspective. This does not necessarily militate against this paper’s hypothesis, which 
states in part that American federalism with its emphasis on separation of powers lends itself to textual herme-
neutics, since these earliest decisions were made by people who fought the Revolution, created the laws, and 
precipitated their initial applications. Later courts, though, still committed to the separation of powers, had to 
rely on the text of laws themselves rather than their own recent memories of creating those laws. In some in-
stances, they were more cautious with the drafting of the laws, attempting to ensure that the text and intent 
more closely matched.  
 151.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place sub-
ject to their jurisdiction.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction there-
of, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
15
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no specific reference to slavery or involuntary servitude, in the context of the Thirteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments and its passage following the Civil War, there was no uncer-
tainty in American courts regarding its meaning.152 This is plainly illustrated in the 
Slaughter-House Cases.153 
The Slaughter-House Cases were responses to a Louisiana law that created a 
slaughterhouse monopoly under the guise of public health and safety, which the state 
could have achieved through other means such as zoning restrictions or health regula-
tions.154 Claims regarding public health and safety aside, the law was marked by an 
“odor of corruption,” though the allegations of bribery and local corruption are histori-
cally uncertain.155 In their complaint, the plaintiffs, who were not former slaves, cited 
provisions of the newly passed Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, 
equating their injuries under the monopoly with involuntary servitude.156 The plaintiffs 
claimed that the Louisiana law had abridged their privileges and immunities without due 
process, had denied them equal protection, and had deprived them of property without 
due process, leading the Court to engage in a detailed analysis of the language, scope, 
and purpose of each Amendment.157 
In issuing its decision, the Court first looked to the plain language of the Thirteenth 
Amendment,158 which specifically mentions slavery and involuntary servitude.159 In its 
analysis, the Court affirmed that the purpose of the Amendment was to declare that the 
“personal freedom of all the human race [is] within the jurisdiction of this government” 
and that the Thirteenth Amendment was “designed to establish the freedom of four mil-
lions of slaves.”160 The amendment was written, and quickly thereafter interpreted, with-
in this racially charged discourse. Finding in favor of the plaintiffs on this argument, 
then, would require “withdraw of the mind from the contemplation of this grand yet sim-
ple” purpose and would “with a microscopic search endeavor to find in [the Thirteenth 
Amendment] a reference to servitudes” at no time contemplated by those who wrote and 
fought for the Amendment.161 
The Court then looked to the purpose and intent of the Fourteenth Amendment,162 
                                                                                                                                               
the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”). 
 152.  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873). 
 153.  See generally id. 
 154.  Id. at 43. 
 155.  RONALD M. LABBE & JOHNATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: REGULATION, 
RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 84 (2003). 
 156.  Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 66. 
 157.  Id.  
 158.  Id. at 68-69. 
 159.  US. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place sub-
ject to their jurisdiction.” 
 160.  Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 69. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  US. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction there-
of, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
16
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which mentions neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, but was nonetheless intended 
to protect the rights of former slaves.163 Even after the Thirteenth Amendment, which 
abolished slavery, the life chances and conditions of former slaves would have been “al-
most as bad as [they were] before” if the federal government had not provided additional 
procedural protections.164 According to the Court, Congress intended the due process and 
equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to address racial disparities 
and injustices felt most acutely by former slaves.165 With the Civil War and abolition of 
slavery “almost too recent to be called history,” the Court asserted that no one could miss 
the “one pervading purpose” of the Amendment—specifically, the freedom of former 
slaves.166 
Like the Marshall Court in Marbury, the Court in the Slaughter-House Cases was 
able to draw on recent memory to interpret constitutional language.167 Each Justice was 
aware that the Amendments were passed with former slaves in mind and that the 
Amendments were meant to protect the former slaves’ rights in a society that was largely 
hostile to them. Those rights both shaped and were shaped by the national discourse on 
power, with special regard for how the federal government would relate to individuals 
and states.168 The Slaughter-House Cases’ majority drew on both a textual and teleologi-
cal hermeneutic to protect one set of federalist priorities, those related to the relationship 
between a central government and its peripheries, while the dissent called for a purely 
textual examination of the plain language of the Amendments in the interests of another 
set of federalist priorities, those related to the strict functional separation of powers.169 
The Slaughter-House Cases demonstrate the ways in which the American discourse on 
power and the shape of federalism, nearly a decade after the Civil War, was evolving to 
apply the principles of federalism in new ways to new circumstances.170 
C. Supreme Court of the United States: Decisions Following World War II 
Within the context of a war with Europe in full force and political pressure on gov-
ernment officials to “persecute and even prosecute allegedly disloyal citizens,”171 an ac-
tion was brought against a naturalized citizen, William Schneiderman, for his association 
with the Workers (Communist) Party of America and the Young Workers (Communist) 
                                                                                                                                               
the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
Id. 
 163.  Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 70. 
 164.  Id.  
 165.  Id. at 72.  
 166.  Id. at 71. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873). 
 169.   Id. at 83 (Fields, J., dissenting). Justice Field’s dissenting opinion is strictly limited to the language of 
the Amendments and does not draw on a discussion of purpose or intent. 
 170.  LABBE & LURIE, supra note 155, at 1-2. Despite debate over the rationale in the Slaughter-House Cases, 
“Miller’s decision has not been overruled. Moreover, it did not prevent his Court, sometimes with his concur-
rence, from finding awesome breadth in the [Fourteenth] [A]mendement—a process that accelerated after his 
death and especially during the mid and late twentieth century.” Id. 
 171.  David Fontana, A Case for the Twenty-First Century Constitutional Canon: Schneiderman v. United 
States, 35 CONN. L. REV. 35, 42 (2003).  
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League of America.172 To become a naturalized citizen, Schneiderman was statutorily 
required to, and in 1927 did in fact,173 claim to be a person who was “attached to the 
principles of the Constitution of the United States.”174 Twelve years later, in 1939, the 
United States attempted to revoke his citizenship, “most likely to strike a blow against 
possible disloyalty, especially pro-Communist or pro-Nazi [sentiment]” at a time when 
America was quite literally at war with Communist forces in Europe.175 In its denaturali-
zation suit against Schneiderman, the United States claimed that his “citizenship was il-
legally procured,”176 because Schneiderman’s communist activities meant that he neces-
sarily could not be “attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States” 
and that he “advised, advocated and taught the overthrow of the Government, Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States by force and violence.”177 
The Solicitor General focused on the meaning of the statutory language regarding 
attachment to the principles of the Constitution, acknowledging that, for purposes of 
proving non-attachment, it was not enough to prove that a defendant believed “that the 
laws and the Constitution should be amended in some or many respects.”178 But even if 
an alien voiced certain dissatisfactions with the government, “an alien must believe in 
and sincerely adhere to the ‘general political philosophy’ of the Constitution.”179 Essen-
tially, the government argued that there are greater and lesser fundamental constitutional 
principles, and that being “attached to the principles of the Constitution” means not 
wanting to change the more fundamental principles.180 
Schneiderman argued that “a person can be attached to the Constitution no matter 
how extensive the changes are that he desires, so long as he seeks to achieve his ends 
within the framework of Article V.”181 In other words, according to Schneiderman, the 
only limitations on constitutional changes were procedural requirements themselves, ra-
ther than a principle of absolute entrenchment.182 The Court agreed with Schneiderman 
                                                          
 172.  Schneiderman v. U.S., 320 U.S. 118, 121-22 (1943).  
 173.  Id. at 120. 
 174.  Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 4, 34 Stat. 596. 
 175.  Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 121; Fontana, supra note 171, at 43. 
 176. Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 121.  
 177.  Id. at 120-21. 
 178.  Id. at 139. 
 179.  Id. at 140. 
 180.  Fontana, supra note 171, at 44, n.41. The author discusses the ramifications of the government’s argu-
ment as well as some important questions that come to light: “Are some provisions of the Constitution more 
important than others? . . . How easy or hard should it be to change those provisions? . . . Does believing in one 
of those provisions mean that changing such a provision should be impossible or more difficult or somehow 
problematic?” Id.  
 181.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose 
amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of 
the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either 
case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified 
by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths 
thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress; 
provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight 
hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth sec-
tion of the first article; and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal 
suffrage in the Senate. 
Id.; Schneiderman, 320 U.S.at 140.  
 182.  Fontana, supra note 171, at 46. 
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for the most part, viewing both the statute in question and the Constitution through a 
largely proceduralist lens.183 Proceduralism is at once textual and teleological, looking to 
the language of a statute or the Constitution, and also taking into account the intended 
democratic means for change in substance, interpretation, or function.184 
Though Schneiderman does not occupy the same place in the American canon of 
constitutional law that Marbury or the Slaughter-House Cases hold,185 it fits well with 
them for illustrative purposes. Following times of cultural shift and increases in the na-
tional discourse on power—such as the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and World 
War II—the Court has employed textual, teleological, or hybrid strategies to address 
concerns regarding the ability of the federal government to employ ideological litmus 
tests,186 as well as the balance of powers between branches of government187 and be-
tween the federal government and states.188 At each turn, far from being a mere function 
of differences between individual Justices, the rationales and holdings of the Court, 
though occurring within a relatively static federalist structure, seem to have been more 
responsive to the historically and culturally situated discourse on power.189 
D. European Court of Justice: Supremacy of EU Law 
Costa v. ENEL established the supremacy principle in the European Union.190 
Though not an exact parallel to Marbury, Costa played a similar role in the EU, estab-
lishing the doctrine that domestic law must give way to EU law when there is a con-
flict.191 The Italian Republic created the National Electricity Board (Ente Nazionale per 
l’Energia Elettrica or “ENEL”) in 1962.192 Flaminio Costa, a lawyer and shareholder in 
one of the electrical companies subject to the nationalization scheme, refused to pay an 
electricity bill to ENEL for the power that the private predecessor company supplied to 
him.193 In an action before a national judge, Costa alleged that the 1962 law creating the 
nationalization scheme conflicted with provisions of the Treaty Establishing the Europe-
an Economic Community (“EEC”) of 1957.194 Article 177 of the EEC, which was incor-
porated into Italian law by Law No. 1203 of October 14, 1957, provided “[w]here such a 
question is raised before any court or tribunal of one of the Member States, such court or 
tribunal may, if it considers that its judgment depends on a preliminary decision on this 
                                                          
 183.  Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 137. “The constitutional fathers, fresh from a revolution, did not forge a po-
litical strait-jacket for the generations to come.” Id. 
 184.  See John A. Drennan, Words That Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional 
Theory, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1510, 1512-14 (1996) (comparing proceduralism to originalism and other interpre-
tive strategies). 
 185.  Though Fontana makes a strong argument that it should, especially following September 11, 2001. Fon-
tana, supra note 171, at 35-37. 
 186.  Schneiderman, 320 U.S. 118.  
 187.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 188.  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).  
 189.  One of the elements of the Court’s discourse is acknowledgement of a generalized fear of the “other”–
British imperialists in Marbury, former slaves in The Slaughter-House Cases, and Communists in Schneider-
man.  
 190.  Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585. 
 191.  Puder, supra note 69, at 575. 
 192.  Id. at 571. 
 193.  Id.  
 194.  Id. at 571-72. 
19
Kern: Judicial Interpretation as a Discourse on Power: An Examination o
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
KERN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2013  7:20 PM 
230 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:211 
question, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.”195 Relying on that provi-
sion, the Italian judge stayed the proceeding and requested an order from the ECJ.196 
The Italian government took the position that the national courts were barred from 
referring questions to the ECJ when they could apply domestic law to resolve a dis-
pute.197 Despite the fact that the EEC Treaty had been incorporated into national law, the 
Italian government argued that the provisions in the treaty had no effect on national law 
because the subsequent 1962 law creating ENEL overturned those provisions, invalidat-
ing the earlier law.198 Essentially, the government asserted that the conflict was between 
two statutes rather than a clash between a superior treaty and an inferior statute.199 
The ECJ concluded, however, that it had jurisdiction over the matter and that the 
EEC Treaty gave rise to rights and obligations for citizens of Member States that were 
directly enforceable in national courts.200 The court went on to state that the 1962 domes-
tic law could not take precedence over the treaty provisions, even though it came later in 
time.201 “The integration into the laws of each Member State of provisions which derive 
from the Community . . . make it impossible for the States, as a corollary, to accord prec-
edence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on a 
basis of reciprocity.”202 
Following the establishment of jurisdiction and the unequivocal statement regard-
ing the supremacy of EU law, the ECJ provided the Italian court binding instruction on 
how to construe the elements of the treaty provisions in relation to Costa’s action.203 The 
court’s order became one of the most significant ECJ decisions, particularly in regards to 
the relationship between the domestic laws of Member States and the legal order of the 
EU.204 
Costa is especially significant because the supremacy principle is not explicitly 
stated anywhere in any of the EU treaties, then or now; rather, the court created the prin-
ciple extratextually, inferred from the intentions of the Member States as a means of 
maintaining the developing European integration, particularly as it concerned the com-
mon market.205 For the Court in Marbury, the source of the supremacy of federal law 
over States was the Constitution itself, while for the ECJ, the source of the supremacy of 
European Community law over national law was the newly created legal system, as evi-
denced by the Costa court’s statement, “[b]y creating a Community . . . the Member 
                                                          
 195.  EEC Treaty, art. 177 (now Article 234 of the EC Treaty) provided: 
The Court of Justice shall be competent to make a preliminary decision concerning: the 
interpretation of this Treaty; the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of 
the Community; and the interpretation of the statutes of any bodies set up by an act of the 
Council, where such statutes so provide. Where such a question is raised before any court 
or tribunal of one of the Member States, such court or tribunal may, if it considers that its 
judgment depends on a preliminary decision on this question, request the Court of Justice 
to give a ruling thereon. 
 196.  Puder, supra note 69, at 572-73. 
 197.  Id. at 573-74. 
 198.  Id. at 574.  
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. at 575. 
 201.  Puder, supra note 69, at 575. 
 202.  Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593-94.  
 203.  Puder, supra note 69, at 575. 
 204.  Id. at 573. 
 205.  Id. at 577. 
20
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 49 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss1/7
KERN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2013  7:20 PM 
2013] JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AS A DISCOURSE ON POWER 231 
States have . . . created a body of law which binds both their nationals and them-
selves.”206 
E. European Court of Justice: Direct Effect of EU Law 
The ECJ also created a second extratextual principle—the principle of direct ef-
fect.207 Direct effect means that, without any Member State action, treaty provisions that 
are clear and conditional208 impose obligations and confer rights to individual citizens 
that those citizens can invoke before their national courts, even in the absence of any na-
tional legislation implementing the provision.209 
Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen established the 
principle of direct effect.210 Van Gend en Loos was a transportation company that im-
ported urea-formaldehyde from the Federal Republic of Germany (i.e., West Germany) 
into the Netherlands.211 The Dutch revenue authorities applied a tariff on the import, to 
which Van Gend en Loos objected on the grounds that the tariff was contrary to estab-
lished European Community law, specifically, Article 12 of the EEC Treaty.212 Van 
Gend en Loos brought its case before a national court which, pursuant to Article 177213 
of the EEC Treaty, referred the question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.214 
At the time, Article 12 stated, “Member States shall refrain from introducing be-
tween themselves any new customs duties on imports or exports or any charges having 
equivalent effect, and from increasing those which they already apply in their trade with 
each other.”215 At issue was “[w]hether Article 12 of the ECC Treaty has direct applica-
tion within the territory of a Member State, in other words, whether nationals of such a 
State can, on the basis of the Article in question, lay claim to individual rights which the 
courts must protect.”216 Nowhere in the language of Article 12 were individual citizens 
of Member States mentioned. Rather, the language was specifically directed toward the 
Member States themselves.217 Van Gend en Loos argued, that even in the absence of 
language regarding individual citizens, “infringement of [Article 12] adversely affects 
the fundamental principles of the [European] Community, and individuals as well as the 
Community must be protected against such infringements.”218 
The governments of Belgium, The Netherlands, and Germany each asserted that 
the effect of Treaty provisions on Member States was a matter to be decided by national 
law rather than the Treaty itself.219 However, the Commission on the EEC reasoned that 
                                                          
 206.  Id. (quoting Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 593).  
 207.  Eric F. Hinton, Strengthening the Effectiveness of Community Law: Direct Effect, Article 5 EC, and the 
European Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 307, 314-19 (1998).  
 208.  Id. at 315. 
 209.  Id. at 315-16. 
 210.  Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Adminstratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1. 
 211.  Id. at 4.  
 212.  Id. at 4-5. 
 213.  EEC Treaty art. 177 (as in effect 1958) (now EEC art. 234).  
 214.  Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 5.  
 215.  EEC Treaty art. 12 (as in effect 1958) (now TFEU art. 30). 
 216.  Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 3.  
 217.  Id. at 7. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id. at 5-6. 
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such a finding “would have the paradoxical and shocking result that the rights of indi-
viduals would be protected in all cases of infringement of Community law except in the 
case of an infringement by a Member State.”220 
The issues raised in the case, then, concern the nature of power and its various bal-
ances within the early European Community. That is, in the relationship between the 
Community and Member States, between Member States and their citizens, and between 
citizens and the Community, who has the power to interpret Community law, what obli-
gations and rights does it create, and for whom? To answer the questions before it, the 
ECJ asserted, “it is necessary to consider the spirit, the general scheme and the wording 
of [Treaty] provisions.”221 In its reasoning, the court explicitly considered the purpose of 
Community law, and not merely the law’s structure or text, as essential if such law is go-
ing to be at all meaningful or effective.222 
In its decision, the court affirmed that the objective of the EEC Treaty is to estab-
lish a common market (essentially a free trade block) among the Member States.223 The 
court further stated that the Community can fulfill this objective only if the relationship 
between Community law, Member State obligations, and the rights of citizens are in bal-
ance.224 To this end, the court concluded, “the Community constitutes a new legal order 
of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, 
albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States 
but also their nationals.”225 The purpose of Community law itself, quite apart from the 
texts of EEC Treaty provisions or Member State legislation, confers upon citizens “rights 
which become part of their legal heritage,”226 and “[t]he vigilance of individuals con-
cerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition to the super-
vision entrusted by [EEC Treaty provisions] to the diligence of the Commission and of 
the Member States.”227 
From within this post-war European discourse on integration—emphasizing a 
common market and a shared sense of obligation among the Community, Member 
States, and citizens—it follows that under “the general scheme and the wording of the 
Treaty, Article 12 must be interpreted as producing direct effects and creating individual 
rights which national courts must protect.”228 By looking to the objectives of the EEC 
Treaty, even absent any such affirmative language within Article 12, the ECJ created a 
doctrine meant to effectuate the hoped-for integration.229 
Van Gend en Loos and Costa, taken together, establish the twin principles that 
Community law is supreme over all conflicting national laws, including constitutions, 
and that “national courts are bound to give effect to Community law by setting aside any 
conflicting national law or practice.”230 The rationale employed by the court in reaching 
                                                          
 220.  Id. at 6. 
 221.  Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 12. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Id.  
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 12. 
 227.  Id. at 13.  
 228.  Id. at 13 (emphasis added).  
 229.  Id. at 12-13.  
 230.  Fennelly, supra note 12, at 660.  
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its decisions is just as significant as the principles those decisions created.231 
The court’s preferred hermeneutic consists of Van Gend en Loos’s formulation of 
“the spirit, the general scheme and the working” of Community law, with the recent ad-
dition of “context” as an interpretive tool.232 The operative language in the ECJ’s ra-
tionale, with slight changes from case to case, has been that interpretations of Communi-
ty law must consider “not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and 
the objects of the rules of which it is a part.”233 
Part of the context of European Community law for which United States law has 
no parallel is the variety of languages within the community, and the fact that no official 
language exists, and therefore every law and every decision are written in every language 
of the Member States.234 This makes a purely textual hermeneutic impossible, since in-
terpretation of Community law according to a strict examination of text would necessari-
ly privilege one language—and by extension the Member States who speak that lan-
guage—over all others.235 Such a privileging of language would militate against the 
Community’s primary objective of integration “among the peoples of Europe, . . . eco-
nomic and social progress . . . by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide 
Europe [and] . . . the removal of existing obstacles . . . in order to guarantee a steady ex-
pansion, balance trade and fair competition . . . .”236 The recognition that the Community 
is made up of multiple and distinct linguistic and socio-cultural groups offers a pragmatic 
reason to prefer a teleological interpretive approach; however, absent the larger objective 
of integration, the Community could move toward a textual method by simply designat-
ing an official language for legal purposes. That this has not happened evidences the 
Community’s awareness of the power imbalance that such a privileging would create.237 
Individual members of the ECJ have explained their reliance on a teleological ap-
proach, stating “[t]he Court constantly uses teleological interpretation . . . [and] seeks to 
apprehend the meaning of law in the light of its purpose . . . .”238 This has led the ECJ to 
adopt a rule, sometimes in spite of the specific language of a treaty provision or Com-
munity law, that is “most conducive to the ultimate objective of Community integra-
tion.”239 
If this paper’s hypothesis were only concerned with the relationship between judi-
cial interpretation and an existing federalist structure, then the objection, noted above in 
Section III, would indeed be problematic. It would be problematic because the different 
respective structures of American and European federalism do not necessarily lead to ab-
solute distinctions in textual versus teleological interpretive methods. However, the 
evolving discourse on power is also operative in determining how laws are interpreted.240 
                                                          
 231.  Id. at 664-66 (discussing the reasons why the ECJ relies on the teleological method of interpretation).  
 232.  Id. at 664. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Id. at 664-65. 
 235.  Fennelly, supra note 12, at 665. 
 236.  Id. at 670 (quoting from the Preamble to the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Community, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 9-10).  
 237.  Id. at 667. 
 238.  Id. at 667 (quoting Judge Constantinos Kakouris of the ECJ).  
 239.  Id. 
 240.  See generally Larry Cata Backer, Chroniclers in the Field of Cultural Production: Courts, Law and the 
Interpretive Process, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 29 (2000); Lukens, supra note 87; John P. McCormick, Max 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Though what likely remains at the end of this article are more questions than com-
pelling answers, the hypothesis that preferred methods of judicial interpretation (i.e., 
whether a court applies a textual or teleological interpretive method) are functions of his-
torically-located discourses on power within federalist systems may nevertheless con-
tribute something to the conversation regarding judicial interpretation. That conversation, 
at least at the popular level, has become fraught with personal accusations and devoid of 
a sociological understanding of how judicial interpretations are both products of a broad-
er discourse on power and participants in that discourse.241 
For the United States Supreme Court, the national discourses on separation of 
powers that occurred during the newly forming government following the Revolutionary 
War, after the abolition of slavery following the Civil War, and fear of fascist sentiment 
following WWII influenced how the Court interpreted and applied federal law to the 
States.242 In other words, the United States Supreme Court, from the nation’s inception, 
has been a participant in the nation’s discourse on power. During times of conflict, that 
discourse has been amplified and so has its effect on the Court’s decisions. This can be 
seen in decisions during the formation of our government following the Revolutionary 
War, when the discourse was particularly sensitive to the need for governmental powers 
to remain structurally and functionally separate. It can be seen in decisions immediately 
following the Civil War, when the discourse was particularly sensitive to our tendency to 
treat fellow human beings as commodities. Finally, it can be seen in decisions during and 
immediately following WWII, when the discourse was particularly sensitive to fear of 
fascist sentiments and the shocking scale of the atrocities they caused. 
For the ECJ, post-WWII Community discourses about the long history of dis-
integration of sovereign States that created intent to share power among the various sov-
ereigns influenced how the court interpreted Community law and applied it to the Mem-
ber States.243 The shaping effect of Europe’s discourse can be seen in the twin principles 
of supremacy and direct effect of Community law— each principle a judicial creation of 
the ECJ in an attempt to keep the Community integrated. 
As the United States and Europe face new conflicts—whether internal or exter-
nal—new concerns about power and its potential abuses will emerge, and courts will 
continue to shape and be shaped by the resulting discourses. 
 
L. Riley Kern 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Weber and Jurgen Habermas: The Sociology and Philosophy of Law During Crises of the State, 9 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 297 (1997); Nagel, supra note 87.  
 241.  See e.g., Richard A. Posner, Richard Posner Responds to Antonin Scalia’s Accusation of Lying, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/107549/richard-posner-responds-antonin-scalias-
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 242.   See supra notes 105-10 and 129-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of Marbury; see supra 
notes 113-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hayburn’s Case; see supra notes 154-70 and accom-
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24
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 49 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss1/7
